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Academy President's Executive Overview 
One of my most pleasurable, though daunting, jobs as president of the Academy of 
Management in 1998-99 was to select the Distinguished Scholar and Executive of the 
Year. I was lucky enough to find two people who have been in conversation for some 
time about an issue that deeply concerns me. In my presidential speech, which will 
appear later this year in the Academy of Management Review, I outline changes in the 
way knowledge is being created-both in academic disciplines and in companies. I think 
these changes are changing the nature of business schools, and potentially jeopardizing 
their future. James G. March and John S. Reed have had similar concerns for some time. 
The following article summarizes some of their conclusions. 
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John Reed, the Academy of Management's 1999 Ex- 
ecutive of the Year, is co-chairman and CEO of 
Citigroup, the result of the October 1998 merger 
between Citicorp and Travelers Group. It is the 
largest financial service company in the United 
States, with over 100 million members, and assets 
over $600 billion. With the largest share of credit 
card business in the U.S., Citigroup has particular 
potential in e-commerce. I was also especially 
pleased that John Reed accepted our invitation 
because of his enduring interest in social and be- 
havioral science. He is a member of the Corpora- 
tion of MIT, as well as the board of the Center for 
Advanced Behavioral Sciences in Palo Alto, and 
the Spencer Foundation in Chicago. He is also on 
the board of the Philip Morris Companies Inc., 
Monsanto Co., and the Spanish telephone com- 
pany, Telef6nica. 
James March, the Academy's 1999 Distin- 
guished Scholar, convinced John to accept our 
invitation. Jim's outstanding career is hard to 
summarize. Organizations, with Herbert Simon, 
A Behavioral Theory of the Firm, with Richard 
Cyert, and Leadership and Ambiguity, with Mi- 
chael Cohen, are just three examples of work on 
organizations and decision making that strongly 
influenced me and many other members of the 
Academy of Management. Jim has just retired 
from four joint positions at Stanford Universi- 
ty-in management, political science, sociology, 
and education-but his research agenda contin- 
ues. I look forward to reading The Pursuit of 
Organizational Intelligence, which came out in 
1999, and The Dynamics of Rules, which will be 
published in 2000. He has eight honorary doctor- 
ates, and a long list of other honors to place 
beside our selection as 1999 Academy of Man- 
agement Distinguished Scholar. 
The following pages record the presentations 
that our two honorees gave at the 1999 Academy of 
Management meetings in Chicago. Jim March 
briefly sketches out the history of the pursuit of 
ideas in management practice and management 
research, then comments on the risk of business 
schools' becoming too concerned with "relevance." 
John Reed draws on his banking experience to 
argue for the importance of basic research from 
business school academics. They conclude with a 
conversation about the Council he established to 
facilitate academic research in Citicorp. I think 
their reflections are important and well argued. 
Beyond that, they illustrate an important source of 
management ideas- conversational engagement 
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between those in business schools and those in 
business practice. 
Distinguished Scholar of the Year James G. March 
Historically, and I think currently, some of the most 
influential contributors to knowledge and writing 
about organizations have been deeply involved 
with questions about management practice. Many 
of them have been practicing managers. I include 
such contributors as Gluck, Urwick, Barnard, 
Drucker, and Peters, each of whom have been im- 
portant to our understanding of management. 
There has also been a tradition of academic re- 
search in organizations, research carried out by 
people somewhat less directly linked with man- 
agement practice-people like Weber, Simon, 
Selznik, and Williamson. 
The two streams of writing generated by such 
authors have affected each other. It is not so much 
that the writers have learned from each other, al- 
though they have done a little bit of that; it is more 
that they have existed together in a loose commu- 
nity of common concern within which both streams 
have had influence. But they remain relatively in- 
dependent, responsive to different pressures, dif- 
ferent incentives, and different institutions. On the 
one hand, there has been a community of manage- 
ment practice organized around the culture of 
managers and management consultants. On the 
other hand, there has been an academic commu- 
nity organized around the culture of academic dis- 
ciplines, traditions, and institutions. One of the 
glories of business schools in this country and the 
institutions associated with them, including the 
Academy of Management, is the way they have 
brought these two groups together in a productive 
association of relatively tolerant mutual apprecia- 
tion. 
It is, however, an uneasy relationship. The dif- 
ferences in orientation, styles, and cultures pro- 
duce tension. They also produce dynamism. The 
tension, however, makes maintaining a fruitful 
balance between these two streams difficult. It is 
an old story. The pressures of day-to-day adapta- 
The differences in orientation, styles, and 
cultures produce tension. They also 
produce dynamism. 
tion are intolerant of the diversities that serve ad- 
aptation in the long run. Tension between these 
two streams is essential to the health of the field, 
but the opposition that sustains the tension also 
tends to destroy it. The groups struggle for domi- 
nance in a world in which neither can exist long 
without the other. As a result, there is a tendency 
toward grand swings. 
Changes in Business School Orientation 
Business schools have been the site of a lot of that 
tension. Their history is one of continually renego- 
tiating the relative emphasis placed on the one 
hand upon managerial practices as a source of 
ideas, and on the other hand upon academic re- 
search as a source of ideas. Though it is clear that 
many of the more enduring ideas about organiza- 
tions are well grounded in each tradition, up until 
the end of the Second World War, business schools 
were essentially purveyors of business practices. 
Their faculties were drawn for the most part from 
experienced business managers and people linked 
to them. Business schools had relatively little 
standing within academic communities. They 
were ranked largely by their reputation in busi- 
ness. 
Beginning about 1950, however, business schools 
turned to an increased emphasis on academic re- 
search based on academic disciplines. They sub- 
stantially increased the fraction of academically 
trained faculty and writing directed to academics. 
They substantially increased the academic reputa- 
tion of business schools, and the use of academic 
criteria to establish the reputations of their scholars. 
Recently, we have seen movement back toward 
the dominance of practice, and the elevation of busi- 
ness practice to a higher pinnacle of importance as a 
basis for knowledge. This is part, of course, of the 
general public endorsement of business practice. It 
is connected in a general way to the acceptance of 
markets as instruments of allocative decision mak- 
ing. It has certain curiosities which I will not pursue 
in any depth, though I occasionally tell my business 
friends that one of the curiosities of modern life is 
that we are insistent on introducing the methods of 
business to higher education and to the public sec- 
tor, two sets of American Institutions that have been 
conspicuously and intemationally successful in the 
past few decades, much more successful than Amer- 
ican business has been as a whole. That is an unfair 
observation, of course, but it is intended as a re- 
minder that our enthusiasms are sometimes more 
dependent on ideology than on evidence. 
During this period we have transformed busi- 
ness schools. Beginning in the 1980s and continu- 
ing into the 1990s, there has been an increasing 
tendency to make management research in busi- 
ness schools more immediately relevant to busi- 
ness practice. The quality rankings of business 
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schools, which were previously dominated by ac- 
ademic self-rankings that emphasized the re- 
search reputations of the faculty, have been cap- 
tured by the business press with rankings that 
place very little emphasis at all on the quality of 
research as assessed by academic standards. 
Management researchers in business schools are 
clearly increasing in numbers, but they are also 
increasingly publishing their research papers in 
journals associated with business schools, partic- 
ipating primarily in professional associations con- 
nected with business schools, and increasingly 
isolated from researchers in other disciplines. 
They define themselves increasingly as being con- 
cerned with improving management and business 
strategy rather than adding to knowledge. 
If you have not read it, I invite you to read a piece 
in The New Yorker on July 19, 1999 by James Atlas. 
Atlas provides what is probably accurately de- 
scribed as an advertising brochure for the Harvard 
Business School, and, by extension, other business 
schools in the United States and Europe. It is a blurb 
remarkably similar to those produced by other busi- 
ness schools. Atlas frames his essay as an answer to 
the question: "Does the business world really need 
business schools?" I think it is a reasonable and 
interesting question. Atlas, of course, having framed 
it, never addresses it. But he is clearly extremely 
positive about the Harvard Business School and, by 
extension, business schools in general. He pictures 
them as providing a socializing function for entrance 
to business that is oriented to serving the personal 
economic interests of students. 
More specifically, here is what he says about 
the Harvard Business School: It is very rich, and 
operates from a high-cost facility, including lux- 
urious offices and an expensive information net- 
work. It admits only a small fraction of people 
applying for the MBA. It is demanding on its 
students. To its graduates it provides contacts 
and credentials useful for getting ahead. (A little 
footnote, there is no mention in this article about 
any provision of substantive knowledge.) Its 
graduates receive salaries that "tend to start in 
six figures and go up from there." It is in step 
with the market. Thus, it is represented in the 
Silicon Valley by its own offices and by gradu- 
ates from unusual backgrounds who are getting 
rich in entrepreneurial jobs rather than in big 
corporate jobs. It charges high fees and produces 
for sale a large number of cases that are used by 
other business schools. These cases typically be- 
gin like a feature story in a magazine and go on 
to encourage the sense that management is an 
active sport. It emphasizes having faculty who 
are consultants and former executives, who al- 
though they put teaching into a "money ma- 
chine," are nonetheless dedicated and evangel- 
ical. 
This article is an extremely positive portrayal in 
its own terms. Its tone is upbeat and positive. The 
picture is one of a vital social institution confront- 
ing the turbulence of modern life and adapting to it 
successfully. The business school is pictured as a 
partner in the American economy, and as sharing 
the wealth that economy is generating. 
But Atlas's portrait is one of a knowledge-free 
and research-free business school. It places almost 
exclusive emphasis on the linkage between man- 
agement practice and business schools, emphasiz- 
ing the hiring of faculty with management experi- 
ence, and the credentialing and contact-forming 
function of management education. Unless you de- 
fine case writing as research, and the writer 
clearly does not, the description gives no role to 
research or research-based knowledge in business 
education, either as a basis for knowledge or as an 
activity for business schools. 
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The Misguided Search for Relevance Rather than 
Knowledge 
The Atlas article is not important. I assume it was 
not entirely innocent of marketing intent. But it is 
representative of a trend. It portrays a movement 
toward viewing business schools as credentializ- 
ing and contact-forming institutions, of value pri- 
marily to students who want to secure good posi- 
tions in business. That is not an unworthy vision, 
but it is a vision with consequences for the devel- 
opment of ideas about management. It is based on 
a view of knowledge as coming primarily from 
experience. This orientation is, of course, sup- 
ported by many people both in and outside of busi- 
ness schools. For example, it is supported by many 
business people and business school administra- 
tors. It is an orientation that makes it easier for 
business to assess and make use of business 
school faculty and students, places greater control 
over business schools in the hands of business 
institutions, and places greater control over the 
faculty in the hands of academic administrators. 
It is not, however, a vision supported by every- 
one, and I am one of those non-supporters. Of 
course, I should disqualify myself. I am an unre- 
constructed resident of the ivory tower. I went to 
school when I was five years old, discovered I liked 
it, and I stayed. I spent most of my life in profes- 
sional schools, thriving on having students who 
wanted a different life from mine, and on conver- 
sations with business, military, public, and educa- 
tional managers. But for many years I have begun 
every class that I have taught with the assertion: "I 
am not now, nor have I ever been, relevant." In 
some sense I really do not believe that. But I do not 
believe it is anything that I want to spend time 
defending or addressing. Given that attitude, I am 
likely to misconceive the appropriate balance be- 
tween experiential knowledge and research 
knowledge, and thus misperceive the current situ- 
ation. But I do not think I misperceive it too badly. 
I think the recent headlong pursuit of immediate 
relevance in business schools and in management 
research is wrong. Both the pressure toward rele- 
vance and the acquiescence to it are misguided. The 
main advantage of an academic institution can be 
found in academic research and its contribution to 
knowledge. It is not in trying to identify factors af- 
fecting organizational performance, or in trying to 
develop managerial technology. It is in raising fun- 
damental issues and advancing knowledge about 
fundamental processes affecting management. 
What in management research is important for 
management practice? If we look historically, at 
least when I look historically, it is not the passing 
fads of management gimmicks. It is not the numer- 
ous studies attempting to relate performance to 
one thing or another. It is the basic ideas that 
shape the discourse about management-ideas 
I think the recent headlong pursuit of 
immediate relevance in business schools 
and in management research is wrong. 
about conflict of interest, problems with informa- 
tion and incentives, bounded rationality, diffusion 
of legitimate forms, loose coupling, liability of 
newness, dynamic traps of adaptation, absorptive 
capacity, and the like. 
There are reasons why researchers should focus 
on basic research. The comparative advantage of 
fundamental knowledge over experiential knowl- 
edge goes down the closer you come to concrete, 
specific situations. If you are in a situation in which 
a manager has experience, you should not expect an 
academic to be terribly helpful. In those situations, 
managers are likely to know best. The context makes 
a difference, and experience is a good teacher of 
context. However, the comparative advantage shifts 
as you move to more novel situations. It shifts to 
academic knowledge, to general knowledge, to fun- 
damental knowledge. Fundamental knowledge be- 
comes more useful to managers (in combination with 
context-specific experimental knowledge) in chang- 
ing worlds, in new ventures, and when faced with 
the unexpected. Researchers who pursue immediate 
relevance are likely to produce knowledge that is 
both redundant with what managers already know, 
and useful only over a limited time and under lim- 
ited conditions. 
Unfortunately, we are engulfed in a contemporary 
enthusiasm for immediate relevance. That enthusi- 
asm is not new, and the reasons we attend to rele- 
vance are salutary, but our enthusiasm has become 
excessive. It is an enthusiasm that I believe threat- 
ens to make business schools and management re- 
search minor contributors to the development of 
ideas about business management and organiza- 
tions, condemned to the role of pursuing short-run 
research on questions of minuscule importance, con- 
tributing little to intellectual life and therefore to 
business life. In the long run, if business schools 
cease to be effective as intellectual institutions, they 
will not thrive as economic institutions. 
Even if that were not true, our more important 
obligation as scholars is to the pursuit of knowl- 
edge. In particular, we can maintain a significant 
role for significant research on management by 
recognizing two fundamental principles. The first 
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principle is that a commitment to research is a 
commitment to knowledge, not to immediate re- 
sults. Research is a calling, not a job. The second 
principle is that practicing managers are not stu- 
pid. They recognize or can be led to recognize that 
the primary usefulness of management research 
lies in the development of fundamental ideas that 
might shape managerial thinking, not in the solu- 
tion of immediate managerial problems. 
Executive of the Year John S. Reed 
Introduction by James March 
If any proof is needed that managers are not stu- 
pid, John Reed provides it. John is a U.S. citizen 
who grew up in Argentina. He went to MIT for a 
bachelor's and a master's degree. He went to Citi- 
bank, discovered he liked it, so he stayed. They 
decided they liked him, so they promoted him. 
John has talked to my class for a number of 
years. When he first came, he was a wunderkind. 
He was the young, new, dynamic executive who 
was going to lead us out of the forest. The students 
crowded around him, and they cheered, and they 
told me, "This man is a genius-a great man." 
John came again two years later. At that time, 
according to the Wall Street Journal, he was about 
to be fired: Citicorp was in deep trouble, nothing 
he did was working, he was inadequate for the job. 
He came and talked about exactly the same things. 
He talked exactly the same way. He had exactly 
the same style. He had exactly the same ideas. He 
didn't change, but the students saw a totally dif- 
ferent person. They saw someone who was preten- 
tious, who was not really modern, was not really 
up to it, probably a little stupid. 
Then another two years went by, and John came 
back again. By that time he was a savior. He had 
turned Citicorp around and the stock prices were 
going up at a precipitous rate. He was the new- 
found international wonder boy, and students 
flocked. He was exactly the same, had the same 
style, said the same things. Now, however, he was 
brilliant. He was outstanding. 
This history has some implications. Certainly for 
John, I suspect. It also has some implications for 
student judgment, and why we cannot be too at- 
tentive to immediate assessments of relevance. 
I think that John is an extraordinarily talented 
manager, but he is more than that. He has a deep 
commitment to knowledge. He has served on the 
Russell Sage Foundation board. He served on the 
Center for Advanced Behavioral Sciences board. 
He has been actively involved with the Santa Fe 
Institute, and he is here. You may think being here 
is not much, but I will tell you that I saw John in 
California early last week. Between then and now 
he has been in Mexico, Argentina, and Venezuela. 
He arrived here early this morning, and he will be 
in London tomorrow. So being here is no trivial 
thing. He is one of us, and I'm proud to have him 
here as Executive of the Year. 
A Practitioner's View of Management 
Thank you very much, Jim, for your kind words. Let 
me be very honest. I am really here because I love 
being here. I look forward to the opportunity to get 
out of the day-to-day, to sit back and try to under- 
stand what is going on with the practice of man- 
agement and what is going on in the research 
community. It allows me some breathing room and 
gives me a sense of what it is that I have been 
spending the last 34 years doing. 
I am going to comment on the practice of man- 
agement and the research agenda, but very much 
from the point of view of a practitioner. As Jim 
indicated, I joined Citibank over 30 years ago, for 
lots of strange reasons, few of which have had 
anything to do with the company. Lo and behold, to 
my surprise, and maybe to theirs, 34 years later I 
am still here. Not only that, but as many of you 
know, we have just gotten ourselves into a big 
merger, and one would guess I am going to be here 
for a while, because there is much on the agenda. 
I thought I would draw on this experience of 
mine as a practitioner, as somebody who has 
cared a lot about the practice of management and 
who has tried to understand just what it is we are 
trying to do and how it is that we do it. I will add to 
Jim's comments by talking about this business we 
are in from my point of view and drawing on my 
own experience. Hopefully it will turn out to be 
relevant to your own concerns about what is going 
on in the academic enterprise and the role that a 
research agenda plays within that enterprise. 
The Importance of Long-Term, Evolutionary 
Company Success 
Let me make some introductory points. First, I think 
I represent my colleagues who run big companies. 
If you are a banker, you get to know most of the 
people running the big companies around the 
world because they are your customers. Obviously, 
understanding them and their business is impor- 
tant to you, and so in addition to my own job, I am 
an observer of those who have similar kinds of jobs 
in various businesses around the world. 
I think it would be fair to say for most of us, 
whether we would verba%lize it this wa y or not, that 
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our objective in running our business is the long- 
term, evolutionary success of the firm. I mean that 
we try to improve the opportunities that our com- 
panies face over time as we shape those compa- 
nies and as we drive them toward performance. 
The opportunities we describe are broadly defined. 
They can be opportunities for growth in revenue, 
for improved returns, for positioning in new mar- 
kets. For example, without any question the big- 
gest single risk and opportunity facing the bank- 
ing business today is the Internet and what it is 
going to do to how we conduct our business. Our 
objective, however, is long-term, evolutionary suc- 
cess. We try to be in a situation of continually 
improving opportunities and we try like mad to 
avoid getting into dead ends. 
I would argue that profits and price earnings on 
stock and things of that sort are significant and 
important contributors to our evolutionary success, 
but they are insufficient in and of themselves. Hav- 
ing a model of business that stops at the word 
profit is problematic. Most of my colleagues and I 
have come to understand that profit is not a robust 
model and that we need, in fact, a broader vision of 
what it is we are trying to do. We are concerned 
about improving the opportunity space for our en- 
terprise. Profits and value in the stock market and 
return on equity and so forth are important, but we 
have any number of stories of great, profitable 
companies that have reached bad endings rather 
quickly, and so we have gone beyond that. 
Most of my colleagues and I have come 
to understand that profit is not a robust 
model and that we need, in fact, a 
broader vision of what it is we are trying 
to do. 
This basic observation is a challenge to the 
academic enterprise. It defines the nature of 
business practice more broadly than a simplistic 
economic model might, particularly in microeco- 
nomics, where agents are presumed to simply be 
profit maximizers. There is an additional dimen- 
sion. 
The Importance of Effectiveness 
You might ask, "OK, you are a business person, 
what is it that you have to do?" I am of the school 
that says we have to do two things: we decide what 
to do, and we try to make it happen. If you boil 
down all of the practice of business, it is the com- 
bination of those two things and the interaction 
between them that defines the world in which we 
live. 
Obviously your ability to make things happen 
has a direct feedback effect on what it is you might 
aspire to do. When you are younger and starting 
out, you tend to be much more concerned with 
making things happen and making use of tools 
and techniques that you have either observed or 
learned that might convert action into output. As 
you move up in an organization, you spend more 
and more time trying to decide what to do. You get 
it wrong, and you get it right, and it is not easy. But 
basically we are all in the business of figuring out 
what we should do at any given moment in time 
and developing mechanisms and techniques to 
make things happen. 
At this point in time, I sense that businesses 
increasingly are pushing on the envelope of orga- 
nizational performance. We all seem to be butting 
right up against the frontier of effectiveness. Our 
ability to operate within the organization seems to 
be the constraint. You can see that if you look at 
some of the great success stories that people turn 
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to these days, and try to understand them. Take 
General Electric, for instance. 
I know GE reasonably well, and I know Jack 
Welch quite well. I think most people would not 
say that the great success of the General Electric 
Company is its strategy. Most people would say 
that the great success of that company has to do 
with execution, with the fact that Jack, in conjunc- 
tion with his seniors, has driven organizational 
performance of the General Electric Company far 
beyond expectations. They have a bunch of funda- 
mentally uninteresting businesses like power gen- 
eration and phones, and yet they have been able to 
create a company which over an extended period 
of time has sustained impressive performance and 
which commands a very high multiple in the mar- 
ket. Even though they engulf a bunch of businesses 
that frankly are not that exciting, are not that mod- 
ern, and do not enjoy particularly exciting, sustain- 
able growth. Yet they have been able to convert 
that enterprise into a very high performing one 
because they have learned, and they have institu- 
tionalized, mechanisms by which they can take 
their company right to the frontier of performance. 
The Japanese taught us during the 1980s that 
they could do better than Americans thought pos- 
sible. When you started peeling the onion, it turned 
out to be organizational effectiveness and the abil- 
ity to get workers to more effectively bond with 
their jobs within a Japanese enterprise that 
seemed to be the distinguishing characteristic of 
those firms. Americans have learned that, have 
copied that, and have moved it on. 
I spent sometime recently in Silicon Valley try- 
ing to get my mind around the Internet and its 
implications for my own business. I was struck by 
what I am sure is going to be a revolution that will 
have a dramatic impact on the way in which cus- 
tomers interact with the total sense of businesses. 
But I was equally impressed by the quality of the 
people I met, their energy, and the seeming orga- 
nizational effectiveness of people working in Inter- 
net companies. 
I wonder if the ability of these enterprises to 
command the interest of such high quality people, 
who seem to have come up with new organiza- 
tional configurations that allow them to be quite 
effective, differs importantly from more estab- 
lished firms. I wonder if that dynamic is going to 
turn out to be as important to the evolution of the 
business enterprise as the potential of the Internet 
itself. Be that as it may, I think that in the practice 
of business we are pushing right on the envelope 
of organizational performance. We are looking for 
ever more effective ways of causing organizations 
to function effectively. 
Research Contributions to Improving 
Effectiveness 
The academic community has helped define the 
current circumstances of business. It can also help 
open doors to possible future levels of performance 
that we do not fully understand at this point. Being 
a non-academic, I will undoubtedly describe the 
academic community and its contributions with a 
slightly different twist than you might, but as I look 
at the academic enterprise I divide it into two 
groups. 
One group makes use of case studies which re- 
ally are nothing but best practice. They look for 
patterns of behavior that seem to produce success, 
or patterns of behavior that seem on average not to 
produce success, and then draw more general con- 
clusions from this. There is also an awful lot of 
work going on that looks across industries. Both 
approaches allow practitioners to see what others 
have done, and see what has seemingly worked 
and not worked. 
Practitioners can draw some primitive conclu- 
sions from this work. If you see that somebody else 
has been able to achieve something that you have 
not, it clearly gives you the courage and drive to 
make it happen. That is important in business be- 
cause, as I said, deciding what to do is our primary 
task, and having the courage to reach for some 
goals that you might otherwise have thought to be 
unobtainable is clearly very valuable. 
The academic community is not the only source 
of such insight. Consultants do similar things very 
well. And of course the world seems to consist of 
nothing but managerial how-to books these days, 
some of which I find to be quite insightful, though 
I would not characterize the great majority that 
way. These activities also move from best prac- 
tices to generalized conclusions, move from ob- 
servable patterns of behavior to outcomes, and do 
a good job of packaging the results so that they are 
available to practitioners. 
A second group of academics stands farther back 
and draws from the disciplines to get a better sense 
of what is going on. My own experience over the 
years has been that this latter school tends to be 
more useful than the first group because it creates a 
framework that allows practitioners to understand 
how to locate the specific business problems that we 
may be dealing with within a broader space. 
Think, for example, about the usefulness of re- 
search on careers. There is no question that the 
way in which people in the U.S. today are shaping 
their careers has changed. Having some under- 
standing of what is going on would give managers 
new insight into how we might shape our own 
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activities to attract the kinds of people we want to 
have. Incentives are undoubtedly critical. We go 
nuts in the business world trying to incent behav- 
ior. Frankly, we do not know as much about how to 
do that as we would like. I would guess that the 
We go nuts in the business world trying 
to incent behavior. Frankly, we do not 
know as much about how to do that as 
we would like. 
wastage is quite significant and the opportunity 
for incentivizing poor behavior is at least as high 
as the opportunity for incentivizing good behavior. 
We need the opportunity to stand back from our 
immediate concerns to get some sense of what the 
research community has learned about incentives. 
Learning itself is another arena of great interest to 
the business community. There is an awful lot of 
learning that takes place throughout a business 
career, and like it or not, we are in the business of 
teaching people. It would be useful for us to have 
some understanding how to be more effective at 
that. It would also be useful to know when in var- 
ious careers learning plays different kinds of roles. 
These issues come from a broader research 
agenda than best practice summaries. My sense is 
that interaction between the more idea-based re- 
search community and the practicalities of specific 
business problems like the ones I just mentioned 
can be the more productive from a practitioner 
point of view. I do not mean to make light of the 
development of certain mathematical models and 
tools. Clearly, their development has been ex- 
tremely important, particularly in the banking 
business. We do a lot of training through simula- 
tion. We are in the business of managing risk. 
Some of the tools and mathematical models that 
have been generated in the academic community 
clearly underpin a lot of our thinking. I still believe 
that when it gets down to core business problems, 
it is the intersection between a broader theory and 
the specifics of our own problems that produces 
the best sort of insight. 
Examples of Needed Research 
Let me start to develop the idea that broader, more 
basic, research agendas are needed by touching 
on things that involve my own career. The first 
thing that happened to me when I became chair- 
man of Citibank back in 1984 was that it took about 
one day to figure out we had a fundamental prob- 
lem because of international defaults. If you will 
recall, in the fall of 1982 Mexico had suspended 
payment on its debt, and we were in the process of 
coming to grips with what became known as a 
Latin America or even a global cross-border debt 
problem. Citibank at the time had $4.7 billion in 
capital and about $16 billion of exposure in these 
heavily indebted countries, and it didn't take much 
arithmetic to identify a major issue. 
The first thing that I had to confront as chairman 
was to figure out just what the heck this mess was, 
and what we had to do about it. Let me tell you that 
there was very little that I learned at the Sloan 
School that was immediately useful. This was a 
question of getting my hands around what was 
clearly a global problem. It was a problem very 
much being defined by the Federal Reserve, by the 
IMF, and by private sector banks. The banks were 
led mostly by Citibank, because we were both the 
most experienced globally and the most involved 
globally. All of a sudden, I had to stand back and 
try to get my mind around the nature of this prob- 
lem, what likely exclusions might look like, and 
how my own institution, as well as the banking 
sector in general, might deal with this problem. 
I had a professor at Harvard give me tutorials 
during this period so that I could understand more 
about the history of prior debt crises, and the func- 
tionality and usefulness of the IMF. It seemed to 
me, as a practitioner and somebody with a very 
direct responsibility in figuring out how to resolve 
this problem, that I had to be on very firm ground 
with regard to understanding just what a broader 
view of the problem might say about the likely 
patterns that would lead to a solution. 
We spent the better part of eight years working 
on this problem. I would say in retrospect that it 
came to an extremely satisfactory conclusion, in 
the sense that the banking systems survived, in the 
sense that the countries survived, and probably 
were to some degree improved by the experience. I 
do not want to get too carried away, however, be- 
cause there was a lot of economic damage to the 
global system. 
Citi also survived and prospered afterwards, 
which, if you believe in long-term evolutionary 
success, says we found satisfactory answers to the 
two questions of what to do and how to make it 
happen. Some of our colleagues interpreted this 
experience as "No more of this, thank you very 
much," and so the experience also shaped the evo- 
lutionary pathway of participants who today have 
chosen not to participate in this business. In our 
case, it pushed us the other way. We stayed in the 
business and are today still deeply embedded in 
the potential of emerging markets. Academic re- 
search is part of that success. 
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It was pointed out earlier that I am on the board 
of both Philip Morris and Monsanto. These are in- 
teresting companies that I can also draw on to 
highlight areas where business practice can ben- 
efit from research. Philip Morris is a very large 
publicly traded company worth more than $100 
billion in the market. When somebody comes and 
says, "Gee, you are in the cigarette business, why 
don't you just close down the company?" it is hard 
if you were elected by the stockholders to reply, 
"Well, we'll rip up $100 billion of market value and 
that's too bad if it was your investment, we'll start 
all over again." 
Obviously, you have a dilemma here which is a 
fundamental problem and you have to figure out if 
there is an appropriate space towards which you 
might move. I will tell you that we on the board 
were the people who said to the company, "We've 
got to find a solution other than through litigation." 
We felt that we had to reach out, to try to figure out 
what society felt comfortable with: with regard to 
cigarettes, health issues and other things. We had 
to understand that as humans none of us deals 
with bad news easily. If you have been in a busi- 
ness for a long, long time and somebody comes to 
you and says, "Your business creates great harm," 
the first thing you do is not believe it, and then you 
get angry, of course, and very defensive. But then 
the third thing, assuming you get over those feel- 
ings, is that you begin to get your mind to run. 
That is when basic research would be helpful. 
Someone says, "We have a lot of statistical evi- 
dence that says people who smoke are more vul- 
nerable to various diseases." But it is very hard to 
get your hands on what to do about statistical 
evidence, even though it may in fact be true. Be- 
cause there is no mechanism. It is not as if some- 
body comes and says, "This particular chemical in 
your product is causing harm." If that were to hap- 
pen it would be very easy to say, "Fine, we'll re- 
move that chemical from the product." Indeed, if 
you go to Virginia you will find a couple of thou- 
sand acres owned by Philip Morris with one single 
plant in the center, a plant that extracts all of the 
chemicals from tobacco. The plant was built with 
the thought, which has not materialized, that 
somebody was going to some day tell them that 
there was a specific chemical which, if removed, 
would solve the problem, and then they would be 
able to go back and see what was left of their 
product. 
Of course, no one has been able to identify a 
cause and effect between the product and health 
problems. They have simply been able to see the 
statistical correlations. As directors, you cannot 
just say to the stock owners, "Too bad, there went 
100 billion bucks." You have to figure out how to 
manage this enterprise in a space that is not de- 
fined by things that you learn in simplistic case 
studies. You are out in the real world. You are out 
in the world where, as a director, you have to 
recognize that the management of the company is 
going to be slow to come to grips with the problem 
for a lot of very human reasons. 
You can see that the board has a particular role 
to play because we are not as engaged in the 
day-to-day, and therefore, presumably we bring a 
somewhat different vantage point. You are talking 
about social policy. There is no one in America 
who wants to prohibit cigarettes, because we 
learned through Prohibition that that does not pro- 
duce great results, and yet there is no one in Amer- 
ica who wants cigarettes to be sold as easily as 
you would sell gum. There is some middle ground 
and the question is how to find it, how to evolve 
towards it and how to try to reach some kind of 
settlement. 
I toss that out as a real-world example and sug- 
gest to you that the research community has a lot 
to offer people who are trying to deal with these 
kinds of problems. It is the insight from more fun- 
damental research, in behavioral systems, in gov- 
ernment-societal relations, in human values and 
economics, and in other areas that is informative. 
All that research can do is inform us. It certainly 
does not give us answers. It informs us with regard 
to what an appropriate type of behavioral re- 
sponse might be. 
All that research can do is inform us. It 
certainly does not give us answers. It 
informs us with regard to what an 
appropriate type of behavioral response 
might be. 
Now Monsanto, on whose board I also sit, is 
beginning to run into similar problems. Monsanto 
is in the business of genetically modifying plants 
to improve their effectiveness and their perfor- 
mance. They have used the new sciences of bio- 
technology to do what basically used to be done by 
crossbreeding. They have been extremely effective 
and have a pipeline of potential products that look 
like very important products to the agricultural 
community and the global community, including 
very large numbers of undernourished people 
around the world. And yet, there is, particularly in 
Europe but not only in Europe, considerable con- 
cern about the impact that genetically modified 
products might have on the human population. 
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Once again, you are stuck with the problems of 
how to fit your business system into societal val- 
ues. Once again, these are business problems that 
are key to the development of whole new indus- 
tries, and yet they require a set of understandings 
not easily pulled out of a how-to-manage-your- 
company kind of book. We must rely heavily on 
accumulated knowledge and wisdom drawn 
broadly from the fields of sociology and psychol- 
ogy, economics, political science, and so on, to 
understand how to cope with such problems. 
A fourth example from my own career involves 
the Citigroup merger. Citicorp decided about a 
year and a half ago to merge with Travelers, be- 
cause both Sandy Weill and I felt that by merging 
we would significantly improve the likely opportu- 
nities faced by our two companies, as contrasted 
with what might happen to us independently. I 
must say, a year and a half later, that both Sandy 
and I would agree 100 percent that the opportuni- 
ties we saw in fact are there. If anything, the wis- 
dom of the merger is even more compelling than at 
the time we first talked about it. But let me tell you, 
making a merger work is a totally different story. 
We are talking about putting two cultures to- 
gether that are quite different, quite distinct. There 
is a lot of literature out there and I've been reading 
it, because I am trying hard to understand how to 
make this work. I will tell you that it is not simple 
and it is not easy and it is not 100 percent clear to 
me that it will necessarily be successful. Just as the 
body can sometimes reject an organ that it needs, 
business systems can sometimes reject behaviors 
that are required for the system's success. As you 
put two cultures together, you get all sorts of 
strange, abhorrent behavior, and it is not clear 
whether each side getting to know the other side 
helps, or whether having common objectives helps, 
or whether it is just the passage of time. 
Just as the body can sometimes reject an 
organ that it needs, business systems can 
sometimes reject behaviors that are 
required for the system's success. 
I will tell you that the literature on putting to- 
gether two families speaks volumes to me. The 
problems of stepparents, the descriptions of some 
children rejecting one parent, and other children 
rejecting other parents, and all of the children be- 
ing generally ticked off, is all meaningful. The 
Travelers people are ticked off that they did the 
merger, because clearly these Citi people are a 
bunch of idiots, and why did we ever have to go 
into business with them? And the Citi people are 
equally annoyed. Sandy and I both have the prob- 
lem that our "children" look up to us as they never 
did before, and reject the other parent with equal 
vigor, saying "Sandy wouldn't want to do this, so 
what do I care about what John wants." Trying to 
put together one of these mergers brings out a 
whole set of problems that again leads us to reach 
back and lean on a set of insights from a much 
broader research agenda. I would urge you, in the 
academic community, to bring your particular un- 
derstanding to bear on what happens during that 
year, year and a half, two years after merger. 
We are trying to do something, by the way, that 
is truly a merger. Sandy and I are joint CEOs; each 
basically has a veto over the other. He and I get 
along fine. That does not mean we have figured 
out how to run the company well, but it is very 
different from an acquisition where there is a clear 
dominant voice. In a true merger, you really have 
to put together two groups, probably much like 
integrating a school. When schools first became 
integrated in this country, I am reasonably certain 
that the classroom situation must have been very 
difficult for the teachers. Integration is not some- 
thing that just happens automatically. 
Of course, both the press and a certain number 
of people in the company would rather not have it 
be a merger at all, but a power struggle. I think 
people would prefer to shift from the difficulty of 
putting together two cultures to thinking about a 
power struggle. Frankly, they would feel more 
comfortable in a power struggle and more secure 
interpreting likely outcomes, than in a merger 
where what you really have to do is change. You 
have to be willing to say, "Hey, I will no longer do 
things the way I used to do them. I'm going to find 
new ways of doing things that are some kind of 
amalgam of the way I used to do them, and the way 
we've decided to do them in light of the opportuni- 
ties that we are now dealing with." 
There is a lot of literature about power struggles, 
but not enough written about the alternative to 
power struggles. The willingness of people to 
change is limited, and what you pay them seems to 
be inversely correlated with their willingness to 
change. I used to believe that once you paid people 
some of these astronomical salaries that we cur- 
rently pay, you would have mature, self-sufficient, 
self-confident individuals on your team. Let me 
assure you, it is not the case. Once again I would 
reach back to the theme that Jim and I are trying to 
develop. The research community needs to provide 
big ideas; these are the concepts that have the 
most to say to practitioners in the business world 
who Are trying to change their companies. 
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If the academic community, for reasons of sim- 
plicity or whatever, were to move away from the 
tradition of standing back and trying to develop 
big ideas and instead get caught up in trying to 
generate short-term techniques, summarize best 
practices, or make other interpretations of busi- 
ness problems, we will lose some of the dynamism 
that has characterized the U.S. private sector. I 
believe the private sector has benefited tremen- 
dously from the fact that there was a research base 
out there informed by economics, psychology, so- 
ciology, political science, studies of leadership, 
and so on-knowledge about human beings. 
We now are at a point where understanding who 
humans are, how they respond to opportunities, 
and what they dream about is essential to busi- 
ness practice. We are well beyond engineering 
studies, and simple time and motion studies that 
give us insight as to what a production function 
looks like and how it might be managed. We have 
taken the practice of business in this society and 
globally well beyond the mechanical. We are out 
dealing with issues that require the presence of a 
broader understanding. It is not something you 
could generate just by being a management con- 
sultant and observing a number of companies; you 
have to draw on some of the core knowledge that 
we have put together over the centuries. 
My sense from a practitioner's point of view is 
that maintaining the balance between core re- 
search and applied research is as important to us 
as it is to the academic enterprise. The business 
community knows full well that business schools 
perform a useful function sorting potential hires, 
but I wonder whether the business community re- 
ally believes that what happens during those two 
My sense from a practitioner's point of 
view is that maintaining the balance 
between core research and applied 
research is as important to us as it is to 
the academic enterprise. 
years in business school is all that important. The 
schools sort out from the general population those 
who are more ambitious, more energetic, more 
willing to subject themselves to two years without 
income and endure a certain amount of intellec- 
tual harassment in order to say they graduated 
from a business school. But the real question is: do 
you give these students a set of skills that is going 
to serve them well over their careers? On average, 
clearly the answer to that is yes. Are we maintain- 
ing the quality of that endowment? Is the value 
added from those two years as good today as it 
was 15 or 20 years ago? That is not as clear. 
Conversation on Management Research in 
Business 
James March: John, four or five years ago you cre- 
ated something called at that time the Citicorp 
Behavioral Sciences Research Council. I thought 
that it would be helpful if you said what was in 
your mind when you did that. What kinds of con- 
straints were there? What do you think it has ac- 
complished or could accomplish? And what would 
make it better? 
John Reed: I had been on the Board of the Russell 
Sage Foundation for a while and more generally 
involved with social and behavioral science re- 
search activities. There were 168,000 people in Citi- 
group in 100 countries. I was struck by the fact that 
researchers seemed to know an awful lot about 
what is going on within society, while we did not 
have the same degree of insight as to what was 
going on within this society called Citigroup. In- 
deed, we weren't 100 percent sure of what was 
going on at the border between Citigroup and the 
outside world. And so I had the notion that we 
might attract some academic research interest in 
understanding what was going on within, at the 
time, Citibank and Citicorp. In the back of my 
mind, I also had the notion that if this turned out to 
be a useful enterprise, I might be able to convince 
some of my other colleagues who run big compa- 
nies to join me, a step that we have not yet taken. 
Basically, what I did was commit $1 million a 
year for 10 years, so there would be some clear 
funding. I said we would be willing to use this 
money to support any research that passes two 
tests: one was that it has to be academically ac- 
ceptable; in other words, it has to meet an aca- 
demic standard that is no different than that which 
the Russell Sage Foundation would demand of a 
research proposal, to use an example I am familiar 
with. And secondly, the research proposal had to 
benefit from the fact that it was centered within 
Citibank or Citicorp. That meant that we had to be 
willing to make available any and all information 
from within the company and we could put no 
restrictions on publication. 
Needless to say, my lawyers told me that we 
shouldn't do this, but I am very much of the opinion 
that if we are doing something that is fundamen- 
tally illegal or evil, I would rather find out about it 
myself rather than have somebody else find out 
about it. Therefore, if some academic were to stum- 
ble upon some horrible illegal practices on the part 
of the company, I was willing to run that risk. 
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We have for the last three or four years been 
funding research projects that fit into that scope. 
They tend to be involved in organizational issues, 
some of them with regard to motivational issues. 
For example, we have a great study going on as to 
whether or not you can economically justify the 
notion of hiring people who are referred to you, in 
contrast to people who have not been referred to 
you. Frankly, those of us running the company do 
not know how we make the decisions as to who we 
hire, and therefore the insight that we could gain 
on how the system actually works is important. We 
say that we are an equal opportunity employer, 
and in theory we are, but we have never taken a 
look to see if, in fact, we really are. How do we 
make these decisions? Who makes them? How are 
the rest of us informed? These are the kinds of 
questions we cannot answer. 
In any event, we created new capability with the 
Council. It has been functioning now for about four 
years, and my impression is that we are batting 30 
to 40 percent. I am sure that we have not attracted 
the interest of every academic that we would like 
to attract. We clearly have funded some studies 
that have disappointed both the people involved, 
as well as ourselves. But I would also say that we 
have attracted some studies that have turned out 
to be quite useful, and I am hopeful that this will 
continue. Unfortunately, the research community 
missed our merger to a large degree. I like to be 
sitting up in a corner watching this thing take 
place, because there is a lot going on that no one 
appears to understand. 
March: I gather a couple of things. This oper- 
ates more or less as a research foundation, and 
the people who review proposals are, for the 
most part, very well known academics-people 
like Jane Dutton, Bob Gibbons, Jim Baron, ah, and 
yes, I. But also John Reed. Our discussion of 
proposals reveals a side of John that you will not 
find in most executives, or at least I never found 
in most executives. John thinks about these pro- 
posals about the way academics do. I do not 
think that I have ever heard you say, John, "Now, 
will this help Citicorp?" I have often heard you 
say, "Will this contribute to knowledge?" In the 
early days we had a fair number of applications 
of people who wanted to be consultants. We col- 
lectively said that is not what the Council is all 
about. We are about doing research and we want 
to know how a proposal ties into some funda- 
mental questions. I think we've done fairly well. 
Thirty percent is probably pretty close. 
But I am interested, John, in why you think every 
other business executive in the country has not 
jumped to join with us? 
Reed: I think that it is hard for most business 
practitioners to stand back. Business gets a lot of 
attention now, and for whatever reason, society 
has sort of turned business into sport. We now 
have magazines devoted to the play of the week, 
the team of the day and so forth. But the reality is 
that business is hard work. Most of the people who 
get engaged in business get tremendously en- 
gaged in getting things done within the particular 
context of their own business activity. Most, cer- 
tainly not all, but most CEOs are inherently curi- 
ous and well-read people. Typically, they are very 
well-traveled, and exposed to many dimensions of 
life. But the academic community can seem distant 
and not relevant to the immediate sort of concerns 
of these people, and so there is a gulf, there is a 
cultural barrier. 
My sense is that there are people who are 
likely to join us if this endeavor becomes easier. 
Then it will be easier to get another company to 
say, "Hey, I'll make my company available as 
well." Companies have a lot of data about what 
is going on within them. We can create data, and 
create databases that can be sustained over 
time. When somebody wants to do a longitudinal 
study, it is possible for us to create the conditions 
that will allow you to do that. Which is awfully 
hard to do in the academic world. My sense is 
that we will get some other business enterprises 
to join in this, but not all. For whatever reason, 
we are perfectly willing to have a census of the 
whole community every ten years, but not every 
practitioner feels comfortable in having the cen- 
sus of the company's people taken, even though 
there is a lot we could all learn about what is 
going on within our own shop. 
March: Well, John, as you pointed out, your law- 
yers were not all wildly enthusiastic about this 
initially. Have there been any problems? 
Reed: Never. Occasionally we find things that 
should not be happening, and that is fine. We 
correct them. As I said, none of us running big 
companies these days wants to run companies that 
are doing anything that is inherently evil. So if you 
are studying hiring practices and as a byproduct of 
that you discover that they are less than they 
should be, frankly, we are better for your having 
discovered it. Yes, you have created documenta- 
tion that might allow somebody to sue us, but if 
you had not discovered it, we would have contin- 
ued the bad practices, and sooner or later we 
would have gotten sued anyway. And so my gen- 
eral feeling is that if we are doing something that 
we should not be doing, I would just as soon find 
out about it, pay up, and keep going. 
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March: Do you have any reaction from your HR 
people? 
Reed: I think the HR community has found it 
stimulating. There are two views of the HR com- 
munity. One view is that they cut paychecks and 
distribute them. This is not my view. If I had to 
choose one function within the company that I 
would like to be most effective it would be HR. 
What the HR community has found is that basic 
research has allowed them to stand back and ask 
a lot of questions that are quite germane to how 
the company evolves and what kind of internal 
culture we have. 
If I had to choose one function within the 
company that I would like to be most 
effective it would be HR. 
I mentioned that the way business needs intersect 
with changing career pattems and firm needs is im- 
portant. Twice a year, we bring younger people to- 
gether for a one-month study on issues that we are 
concerned with. We call it "team challenge," and did 
one recently about life-work balance. We discovered 
to our immense surprise that there was an undercur- 
rent within the company that was global-this was 
not a U.S. phenomenon, this was a global phenome- 
non. There was tension with regard to our culture 
versus the need to have a normal human life with 
kids and family and so forth. Our HR community 
understands full well that we have to understand 
work-life issues better, we have to have an under- 
standing of changing career issues, and we then 
have to link all of this to the kind of environment we 
create within the company. 
We pay out billions of dollars a year in wages. A 
very significant portion, I would say at least a third 
of it and maybe more, is supposedly performance- 
based incentives. We really are uninformed by any 
robust knowledge with regard to how we pay out 
that money. We have routines and we have bonus 
processes and we get the right people in the right 
rooms talking about the right things. But as an 
observer over an extended period of time, I would 
be astounded if we were coming any place close to 
the mark. You wonder whether the creation of cul- 
tures that makes money so central to the endeavor 
might have second-order effects that are worse 
than the thing you are trying to do. This is a real HR 
issue and the HR community is willing to come in 
touch with researchers to look at the world from a 
different point of view. 
March: With these attitudes, John, why aren't you 
a professor? 
Reed: I have enjoyed my business career be- 
cause we're pushing right to the frontiers. We 
make some mistakes, and I have learned a lot that 
has caused me to appreciate the real need to main- 
tain academic research capability. I also must say 
that I have enjoyed getting some insight into the 
academic world and some of the issues you all 
deal with. We need to keep talking. 
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